In the latest episode in the sordid saga of the Bay Delta Conservation Plan "BDCP" to build the peripheral tunnels, two environmental groups revealed on June 20 [2104] that even an economist hired by BDCP officials won't sign off on the controversial project.
Dr. David Sunding, an economist on the faculty of the University of California-Berkeley and a principal with The Brattle Group, said at the recent Continuing Legal Education Water Law Conference in San Diego that "given the financial uncertainties if he were a water agency, he would not sign off" on the BDCP, according to a news release
"The recently released statements and documents from BDCP on the costs, and who will pay, are more of the same disingenuous statements that they have been making throughout the life of the project," said Barbara Barrigan-Parrilla, executive director of Restore the Delta (RTD). "These unsubstantiated claims show how desperate BDCP officials are to greenwash this project for the public. Documents from public record requests, and statements from their own officials and water agency officials, reveal that the project will be closer to $67 billion in today's dollars, before cost over-runs."
Independent University of the Pacific economist Dr. Jeff Michael concludes that the average water ratepayer will end up paying between $40 and $80 per person per year.[1][19]
Dr. Tracy Collier said that the ISB has eight major concerns:
1. Many of the impact assessments hinge on overly optimistic expectations about the feasibility, effectiveness, or timing of the proposed conservation actions, especially habitat restoration: “Is the scientific basis for the analyses and for the draft EIR/EIS, is it sufficient, is it good enough to support the decisions that are going to have to be made? There are overly optimistic expectations about the feasibility, effectiveness, and timing of the mitigation measures of the conservation actions, especially habitat restoration.”
2. The project is encumbered by uncertainties that are considered inconsistently and incompletely; modeling has not been used effectively to bracket a range of uncertainties or to explore how uncertainties may propagate: “The project has uncertainties encumbering it and one of the problems is that the level of uncertainty that is there is inconsistently applied, so some have more uncertainty, some have less, but it’s not been used,” he said. “They haven’t used modeling to effectively bracket a range of uncertainties, or how to explore how uncertainties may propagate through the system as they compound and cascade.”
3. The potential effects of climate change and sea-level rise on the implementation and outcomes of BDCP actions are not adequately evaluated: “When we asked DWR about that, their response was that the EIR/EIS process is to look at the effect of the project on the environment, but not the effect of the environment on the project. And while that may be the legal context, that’s just a big science issue that applies to levee failures, floods, and invasive species – the effects of those actions on the project itself, we think needs to be considered.”
4. Insufficient attention is given to linkages and interactions among species, landscapes, and the proposed actions themselves: “We don’t think there’s enough attention given to that, he said.
5. The analyses largely neglect the influences of downstream effects on San Francisco Bay, levee failures, and environmental effects of increased water availability for agriculture and its environmental impacts in the San Joaquin Valley and downstream. “In the analyses, they largely neglect the influences of downstream effects on San Francisco Bay. They don’t consider it because its outside the project area and the defined scope. They don’t consider the effects of increased or altered water reliability on agriculture outside the region and what that might do to water quality issues, etc.”
6. Details of how adaptive management will be implemented are left to a future management team without explicit prior consideration of (a) situations where adaptive management may be inappropriate or impossible to use, (b) contingency plans in case things do not work as planned, or (c) specific thresholds for action: “The details of adaptive management and how it’s going to be implemented are just not there,” said Dr. Collier.
7. Available tools of risk assessment and decision support have not been used to assess the individual and combined risks associated with BDCP actions: “We don’t see evidence that a comprehensive risk assessment has been really applied in the system, and there’s not been the use of currently available scientific tools for decision support or how to support decision making based on technical information. There are methods for doing that and we think those could be beneficially applied to this process.”
8. The presentation, despite clear writing and an abundance of information and analyses, makes it difficult to compare alternatives and evaluate the critical underlying assumptions. “There’s a lot of good writing and a lot of good content, but we suffered equally as well as the effects analysis panel with the inability to get to the information we needed,” he said. “… We haven’t seen any attempts to undertake some of the suggestions that we made early on in the process.” “We think BDCP science needs to be integrated with the Delta Science Plan,” he said. “It really provides a framework for trying to effectively use adaptive management in supporting decision making and management actions, so we think that it needs to be a concerted effort, and much like in the state Water Action Plan they now say, the Delta Science Plan, we will do our best to adhere to that, we need to see that same level of commitment for BDCP.” Read more http://mavensnotebook.com/2014/06/03/reviewing-the-science-of-the-bay-delta-conservation-plan/. [P/A explained to ISB at its May 2014 meeting that the ultimate decisions on the BDCP will not be prefaced on "real science", rather as history attests, decisions will be made based on “political science.”]
ATTACHMENT A:
Excerpts from Patrick Porgans & Associates White Paper: Cracking California’s Water Code
Today’s “water crisis” got started 50 years ago in the form of a General Obligation (GO) Bond measure, authorizing the funding and construction of the California State Water Project (SWP). Unfortunately, the SWP, which was made possible by an ingenious funding scheme, has three major flaws: (1) officials willfully and knowingly misinformed the public of its true costs, [1][i] (2) contracted out more water than it could provide (in certain water-year types),[1][ii] “paper” water, a (3) it was sold under the false pretense that it would cost $1.75 billion and would “pay-for-itself”[1][iii] – it never has.[1][iv] In order to stabilize default by SWP agricultural contractors, and to keep the SWP “solvent”
DWR and the contractors devised the 1994 Monterey Agreement, which, among other ingenious schemes. established a “Trust Fund” that sets aside $10 million a year, beginning in 1997, from the earned interest off of California Water Fund (obtained from the sale of publicly owned tideland oil reserves and General Fund allocations), and hundreds of millions of dollars of this same money will be distributed to SWP urban contractors to do what they want with this money. The Monterey Agreement increased the reliability of existing water supplies; providing strong financial management for the SWP; and increased water management flexibility; proving more tools for local water agencies to maximize use of existing facilities.[1][v] (Refer to page 59, Monterey Agreement Another Backdoor Agreement in the “Era of Transparency – composed behind closed doors.”)
Government Water Projects at the Crux of California’s “Water Crisis” Inundating the State in an Era of Bonded Indebtedness: Ironically, the SWP remains at the epicenter of the “crisis” that continues to cost Californians tens-of-billions of dollars of debt from the sale of GO Bond funds – bailouts. Since its inception, the SWP has been inundated with a series of unrelenting crises and the subject of decades of Legislative hearings in failed attempts to reconcile its inherent shortcomings.
As early as 1963 DWR recognized the SWP was going to be short of funds and resorted to issuing millions in revenue bonds. 1967: Governor Reagan’s Water Task Force reported SWP had a $300 million to $600 million deficiency.[1][vi]
1970: DWR appeals to Legislature for passage of Proposition 7; claimed that if it fail to pass it would cause the shutdown of SWP construction, causing a financial disaster.[1][vii]
1985: DWR reports agricultural contractors may not be able to pay their bills.[1][viii]
1991: DWR exhausted SWP reserve funds to buy water to keep agricultural contractors solvent.[1][ix]
1993: DWR resorted to Legislature to pass urgency law to keep SWP financially afloat, issues $150 million in commercial paper notes, via Goldman Sachs, to buy water.[1][x]
2000 through 2006: more than $19.6 billion in GO water and water-related bonds were approved, [1][xi] a significant portion had been used to keep the SWP afloat - Déjà vu. The interest payments on those GO bonds cost taxpayers another $10 billion. In November 2014 voters may be asked to approve yet another $11 billion GO bond Act bailout, being promoted under the guise it will ensure the State’s water supply reliability, shore up its aging infrastructure, and restore the Bay-Delta Estuary. However, according to the Governor and other officials, those funds are only a “down Payment” or leverage for yet another $30 to $40 billion to “move forward” with other components of the project! [1][xii] “Every time we’ve had a problem in the financing of the State Water Project, we’ve tried to take action to solve the problem,…”[1][xiii]
It is apparent that if this bailout cycle is not reconciled, it will continue to add to the State’s ever-increasing debt load, depletion of General Fund revenues, increase cost for State’s borrowing, adversely effecting its credit rating, which was cut to the lowest of all 50 states,[1][xiv] and jeopardized the Golden State’s once promising economic prosperity as eighth-biggest economy[1][xv] in the world.[1][xvi] Because of California’s persistent fiscal problem, bond rating agencies assigned it the lowest rating; a few notches above junk bonds. [i][xvii]
Endnotes shown in Roman numerals are available upon written request.
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